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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RODNEY M. LARSEN, 
P'taJiln,tiff-A ppeUatnt, 
vs. 
EVA FREE KELLY, 
Case No. 
12413 
Def ooiJ,a,n,t-Bepsoindent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court 
In and for Salt Lake County, Utah 
The Honorable James s. Sawaya, Judge 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON 
174 East 8th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant· 
Respondent 
GERALD E. NIELSON 
840 Kennecott BuildiDI 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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II 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RODNEY M. LARSEN, 
Plaimtiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
EYA FREE KELLY, 
Defendant-Repsondent. 
Case No. 
12413 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STAT.BJMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This i8 an action to recover damages for willful re-
fu~al to perform a contract to sell real property. 
11 DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
11 The case wa8 tried to the Court. Defendant was 
gTanted a judgment of no cause of action. Defendant sub-
111itkd proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
1 
., 
to which Plaintiff objected. After discussion betwee: 
the Court and counsel for both parties - Defandant wa. 
instructed to prepare amended findings which he fai!e< 
to do. Sometime thereafter, by inadvertence, the Cour 
signed and filed the findings originally submitted to Ii 
Thereafter at Plaintiff's request, for the purpose 111 
facilitating this appeal, the Court signed an Ord~· 
adopting the findings signed by inadvertance as the fina 
ings of the court in this case. 
Plaintiff made a motion to amend the decision 01 
Judge Sawaya or in the alternative for a new trial, whid 
motion was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judg 
ment in his favor on undisputed facts, or that failing,a 
new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant listed property belonging to her at 
2870-78 South 3rd East, Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter 
referred to as Defendant's property, for sale with Moone; 
Real Estate, a realtor (R. 93 line 5-7). Enoch Bantistaai 
agent for Mooney contacted Plaintiff who offered 11' 
purchase said property, subject to financing for 
$56,000.00 (R. 93 line 8-19). Payment was to be madeb; 
transferring Plaintiff's equity in a property at 320 Clar~ 
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Stred, hereinafter referred to as the Clark Street 
Property for an assigned value of $10,000.00; by Plain-
tiff's assuming or paying the obligations of Defendant 
whid1 encumbered said property and by payment of the 
balance, then estimated to be $18,000.00 in cash. It 
further rPcited that payment and possession was to be on 
or before April 15, 1965. fJ.'he exact terms of said offer 
are more fully set forth in Plaintiff's Exhrbit P-1 en-
titled Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
which was received in evidence and which was at that 
time completed through line 51, including Plaintiff's sig-
nature. Defendant responded by adding the items on P-1 
after line 51 including the list attached thereto and sign-
ing her name just above line 53. Plaintiff accepted that 
agreement by signing on the same line and the parties 
"ach receipted for copies of the completed agreement. 
The items added by Defendant included a reiteration of 
the price of $56,000.00, a dovmpayment of $18,000.00 and 
$10,000.00 for the Clark Street equity. They further 
provided that the home was to be completed by 
finishing the items lised on the attached sheet within 10 
rlays after a loan commitment was given by the bank on 
Defendant's property. They further provided that a 
written appraisal was to be obtained from an authorized 
lending institution on the Clark Street property in at 
least the amount of $35,000.00 (Ex. P-1.) 
On the strength of that agreement Plaintiff applied 
for a loan on Defendant's property (R. 110 line 23 to R. 
l l l li1w 9). Plaintiff obtained a loan commitment sub-
jPd to a pledged savings account in the later part of 
3 
May, 1965. He, in the company of Enoch Bautista, th~ 
went to Defendant's home and advised her of the !oar 
commitment .and the pledged savings account (R. 111 llni 
13 to R. 112 line 15; R. 95 line 21 to R. 96 line 15; andR 
99 line 7-28). Defendant testified variously that she ru~ 
not object to the proposed pledged savings account as sn1 
did not need the money immediately and on several oe 
casions that as a result of that meeting the transactio~ 
was on-going ( R. 99 line 7-28 and R. 146 line 19 to R.14i 
line 20). Plaintiff the immediately, within the lO-da1 
period and at substantial expense completed the items 
listed by Defendant on Exhibit P-1 respecting the Clari 
Street Property (R. 123 line 11-35 and R. 112line11-18). 
Plaintiff or Defendant's realtor then set up a mee1ingpre. 
paratory to closing the transaction at the realtors offiCI' 
At the outset of that meeting Defendant's attorney, Lam. 
bert Gibson, announced there was no deal but that Defend. 
ant would be receptive to a "decent" deal (R. 10 line 9-ll 
andR. H3lines13-22). Plaintiff had prior to that meetini 
obtained a sale of Defendant's property to Tena Birrell 
(R. 115 line 28 to R. 116 line 14). After the meeting he 
formalized that sale with an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase (Exhibit P-4) at which time he ob· 
tained Earnest Money of $7,500.00. A copy of that check 
which was paid and later of necessity returned, was re· 
ceived as Exhibit P-5. He also obtained an appraisal on 
the Clark Street Property in the specified amount (Ex-
hibit P-3). 
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ARGUM1£N1' 
POINT I 
IF THE CONTRACT COULD ONLY BE PER-
FORMED WITHIN A LIMITED TIME AS CLAIMED 
BY DEFENDANT, DEFENDANT MODIFIED THAT 
TIME OR IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE CON-
TINUED VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT BY HER 
CONDUCT IN THE LATTER PART OF MAY 1965 
AND PLAINTIFF WAS EXCUSED FROM FURTHER 
PERFORMANCE AFTER DEFENDANT'S PRECIP-
ITOUS TERMINATION APPROXIMATELY ONE OR 
TWO WEEKS LATER. 
'l'he gist of Plaintiff's case is simply that in the 
latter part of May, 1965, at a time after Defendant now 
claims Plaintiff failed to perform as required by the con-
tract, Plaintiff met with Defendant and her real estate 
agent and advised her that he had obtained a loan 
commitment; that he proposed to her that she accept as 
part payment a pledged savings account in the amount 
of $5,000.00; that she acquiesced or at least did not object 
to the pledged savings account and considered the 
agreement on-going and knew or expected that Plaitiff 
would incur expense and continue to work complete 
the trasaction; that on thait understanding Plaintiff 
expended substantial sums to complete the Clark Street 
Property in accordance with Defendant's instructions. 
On the occasion of their very next meeting approximately 
one or two weeks later, called for the purpose of closing 
the loan and the sale contemplated by the contract, De-
fendant by her attorney at the outset of that meeting 
annolmced that there was no deal, that Defendant was 
terminating the contract beca:use of a failure to close by 
April 15, approximately one and one-half months earlier. 
5 
He then proposed that Defendant was amenable to 
better or as he put it a, "decent" deal. 
As a result of Defendant's deliberate and malicio 
renege - if "renege" is a strong enough term to descril 
what was more than a refusal to complete a deal becalli 
of a change of position or some kind of dissatisfacfa 
with Plaintiff's perfonnance but was in reality a 
attempt to extort a more advantageous deal - Plainti! 
lost a then negotiated sale of Defendant's property for 
profit of $4,500.00 and later lost, in a mortgage fon 
closure, his equity in the Clark Street Property to whit 
the parties has assigned a value of $10,000.00 in thei 
agreement. 
The evidence that supports the facts upon which~· 
foregoing argument is dependent is all either undisput~ 
agreed upon or is the testimony of Defendant. 
Defendant testified concerning a conversation witl 
Plaintiff and her realtor in the latter part of May, 19&i 
wherein they advised her that Plaintiff had obtained i 
loan commitment and wherein Plaintiff proposed tha1 
she accept an escrowed savings account of $5,000.00 ai 
part payment; she said generally she didn't object; tha: 
it was all right; that it was decided that the offer wouk 
be accepted according to when the house was completed: 
and that as a result of that conversation she considerea 
the transaction to be on-going. She further testified tha1 
she knew Plaintiff would be and was working to compleff 
the items-on-the house in accordance with the requirr· 
men ts of their agreement and to complete the loan tram 
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ad ion ( H. 95 line 22-30; H. 9G line 7 -17 ; R. 99 line 7-28 
and R 141i line 19 to R. 147 line 20). Plaintiff testified to 
till' same thing Pxcept he said Defendant indicated af-
finnatively that the pledged savings was acceptable (R. 
111line18 to R. 112 line 18 and R. 131line10-22). That 
Plaintiff expended substantial sums to complete the 
house in accordance with Defendant's instruction is not 
disputed. Plaintiff's testimony is at R. 123 line 11-25. 
Respecting the meeting in Mooney's office and the 
tinH' interval between that and the meeting of the parties, 
there is no substantial dispute. Mrs. Kelly said she didn't 
remember bnt it would have been at least two weeks (R. 
lOS line 1-5). Plaintiff testified the first meeting was 
betwel.•n the 15th and 25th of May (R. 111line18-20) and 
the meeting in the Realtor's office was in the first part 
of June (R. 114 line 9-13). The parties also agreed that 
Defendant by her attorney terminated said agreement 
abruptly. Mrs. Kelly testifed that her attorney said the 
agreement \Vas null and void but they were open to a 
decent deal (R. 107 line 9-14). Plaintiff testified the same 
(Rll4 line 13-22), and that Defendant through her attor-
ney stated that the reason the eontract was null and void 
was that it had not been performed by the 15th of 
April deadline (R. 114 line 23-27). 
The legal propositions upon which Plaintiff's argu-
uwnt depends are : 
1. Defondant conld orally or by her conduct modify 
\hp written agreement. See 30 Am. Jnr. 2d 203 entitled 
7 
"Evidence" subsection 1063 entitled "Subsequent Par, 
Agreement or .Modifications" 
. "l~ ~e absence of a statute providing othe1 
wise, it i~ conw~etent for the parties to a sirupi 
c<;>~tract m wr~tmg, ?efore any breach of its prr, 
visions, to waJ.ve, dissolve, or abandon it, or 1, 
~dd to, change, or modify it or vary or quati!1 
its terms orally or in writing, and thus make; 
new contract." 
2. Defendant is estop~d by her conduct at the rneit 
ing of the parties in the latter part of .May to deny th• 
continuing validity of the the agreement. 28 Am. Jur. i~ 
674, entitled "Estoppel" and waiver subsection 57 en 
titled "Acquiescence", says: 
"The rule is that where a party with full know 
ledge, or with sufficient notice or means of knowl 
edge, of his rights and of all the material fact/, 
remains inactive for a considerable time or a~ 
stains from impeaching a contract or transaction, 
or freely does what amounts to a recognition 
thereof as existing, or acts in a manner incon-
sistent with its repudiation and so as to affect or 
interfere with the relation and situation of the 
parties, so that the other party is induced to su~ 
pose that it is recognized, this amounts t~ ~· 
quiescense and the transaction, although or1gm 
ally impeachable, become unimpeachable." 
For Utah Cases see Caldwell v. Anschutz Drilling Co.,lJ 
Utah 2d 177, 369 P 2d 964, Hilton v. Sloan et al, 37 Utal 
359, 108 Pac. 689, Utah State Bldg. Commission v 
Great American Indemnity Co., 105 Utah 11, 140 P 2° 
763 and Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co. 76 Utah 335, 28~1 
Pac. 151. 
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3. Defendant's anticipatory breach or recission of 
the contract excuses Plaintiff's further performance or 
show of performance. See 17 Am.Jur.2d 912, entitled 
"Contracts", subsection 449 entitled "Repudiation or 
Renunciation". 
''N" early all the courts considering the question 
have reached the conclusion that a renunciation or 
repudiation of a contract before the time for per-
formance, which amounts to a refusal to perform 
it at any time, gives the adverse party the option 
to treat the entire contract as broken and to sue 
immediately for damages as for a total breach. 
There is no necessity in such case for a tender 
performance, or compliance with conditions pre-
cedent, or waiting for the time of performance to 
arrive, a1though this is optional. No notice need 
be given that repudiation is treated as a breach." 
POINT IL 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN RE-
SCINDING THE AGREEMENT REPRESENTED BY 
EXHIBIT P-1. 
While Plaintiff intends to negate the proposition 
that Defendant was entitled to rescind, he does not intend 
to waive or in any way relieve Defendant of the burden 
of providing that she was entitled to rescind, in the event 
the court finds that she had that burden and that such en-
itlernent to rescind is esssential to her defense and the 
decision of the trial court. 
Defendant claims Plaintiff did not perform within 
the time provided in the contract for payment. P answers 
- In addition to the arguments heretofore made regard-
9 
ing estoppel and modification of that agreement, Plain 
tiff claims Defendant's Counter-Offer, that part of Ex 
hibi t P-1 after line 51, modified that time when it provide,! 
for another indetenninate time to-wit: 
"Completion of the home 10 days after a loau 
commitment, etc." 
Defendant's attorney claims that she did not agree 
to the pledged savings account but that is contrary ti 
Plaintiff's own testimony (R. 95 line 23-30, R. 96 line 
7-17, R. 99 line 7-28 and R. 14G line 19 to R. 147 line 20). 
Plaintiff testified that if Defendant had objected to the 
pledged savings account, he was prepared to go forwarn 
with the deal and that he would take the pledged saving> 
account (R. 126 line 9 to R.127 line 8). 
Defendant's attorney has claimed that the Clari 
Street Property was not completed in accordance witl1 
the contract - but Defendant was unable, after warnin1 
that it was important and after ample opportuniy, tote~ 
the court one item that was not completed (R. 97 line 1 
to R. 98 line 5). She did claim that only the front yard 
was landscaped and not the back or side yard (R. 97 line 
1-10) but Exhibit P-1 on which the obligation to land-
scape depends provides : 
"Seller to landscape and sprinkling system on 
f rant of home" (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff testified that all of the items were completea 
and that he had not at the time of the trial been advised 
10 
of any items not completed (R. 112 line 12-15 and R. 123 
line 26 to R. 124 line 1). Plaintiff contends further that 
the undisputed fact that Defendant did not simply reject 
till' deal but wanted to continue the deal on better terms 
io ('\·idPnce from which it may be inferred that the Clark 
Stred Property was comvleted satisfactorily. 
H there were non major items that were not com-
plekd, Defendant was not justified in summarily term-
inating the contract without giving Plaintiff any kind of 
opportunity to correct them. See 13 Am. Jur. 2d 97 
entitled "Building Construction contracts" Section 101. 
"However, before partial failure of performance 
of one party will give the other the right of res-
cission, the act failed to be performed must go to 
the root of the contract. There must be a substan-
tial default on the part of the contractor in order 
to justify rescission by the owner, and minor 
omissions or slight departures from the letter of 
the contract are not sufficient to justify re-
scission." 
Also see Annotation at 107 ALR 1035 entitled 
''Owner's Right to Rescind Building and Construction 
Contract for Default of Contractor" which states the 
general rule: 
''Default of the contractor in minor details of a 
building contract is not ground for its recission 
by the owner. There must be substantial default 
Wray v. Young (1922) 122 Wash. 330, 210 Pac. 
794." 
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....., 
Defendant ha::> claimed a right to rescind becau~· 
Plaintiff did not tender the sum of $18,000.00 in cash. 
P answern - First, Defendant by her precipitou, 
termination did not give Plaintiff any opportunity 11. 
make such a tender, and excused him from it. 
Second, Plaintiff was ready, able and willing to pay t!J, 
$56,000.00 for the property as agreed. The meeting at 
w.hich Defendant abruptly terminated the contract wai 
for the purpose of closing the transaction (R. 112 line 2~ 
to R. 113 line 1). Defendant was aware that Plaintiffwai 
obtaining a loan to purchase her property (Exhibit p.1 
is conditioned on Plaintiff's obtaining a loan commit 
ment). While Defendant claims that she should not be 
required to escrow a deed the closing was proceeding in 
accordance with usual commercial procedures followed in 
this community of which the court took judicial notice 
(R. 149 line 24-28). 
Third, Defendant's attorney has claimed that Plaintiff 
was obligated to tender $18,000.00 even though that 
amount exceeded Plaintiff's equity in her property after 
application of the Clark Street Property. But Defendant 
testified clearly that she only intended to get a total of 
$56,000.00 (R. 1-!2 line 20-25). That the $18,000.00 was a 
wrong estimate by Defendant of her equity is obviously 
explained by the fact that Defendant was confused about 
the extent to which her property was encumbered (R. 
140line11toR.141line18). 
Defendant also claims that the appraisal report on 
the Clark Street Property mentioned in Exhibit P-l 
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1rhich is ih;elf Exhibit D-12 was not prepared until after 
the abrupt termination. 
Plaintiff contends first that it was not his obligation 
to obtain the appraisal. Exhibit P-1 did not provide who 
~hould obtain it. Defendant being the author of provision 
should have the ambiguity construed against her; and 
Second, Plaintiff was prevented and excused from 
providing the appraisal by Defendant's abrupt termina-
tion. 
Defendant has also claimed that the testimony of 
Robert Ford that loan commitments are usually made 
within two weeks of the appraisal report and that the 
date of April 12, 1965 appears on the appraisal report 
Exhibit D-12 indicates the conunitment must have been 
made by April 26 and therefore Plaintiff had not per-
formed within ten days of the loan commitment. Plain-
tiff contends, the testimony of Ford about usual time 
intervals ( R. 155 line 17 -18), could hardly be said to 
fairly contradict the direct testimony of Plaintiff that 
the loan conunitment was in fact made in the latter part 
of May 1965 (R. 111 line 6-9 and R. 112 line 17 and 18). 
Moreover the trust deed and note Exhibits P-8 and 9 
8how dates of May 25, 1965. 
Perhaps more importantly all of the testimony indi-
cates the meeting of the parties in Defendant's home was 
in thP latter part of May, a time well after any right to 
rescind for that reason had matured. The arguments 
heretofore made concerning the modification of the 
agreement by that meeting and/or the estoppel to deny 
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the continuance of the contract after that meeting area~ 
applicable to defeat this afterthought of Defendan!'i 1 
attorney. 
·The foregoing arguments constitute a positive stale 
ment of Plaintiff's disagreement with findings of lac: 
number 5 through 12 and all of the conclusions of law' 
and the Decree adopted by Judge Sawaya herein. Tlm 
were stated particularly in Plaintiff's objection to pro 
posed findings of fact, conclusions of law and Decrei 
filed herein at the time of the motion for new trial (R. 
73, 74 and 75). 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT ' 
PLAINTIFF SUFFERED DAMAGES IN THE SUM 
OF $14,500.00. 
Plaintiff testified that prior to Defendant's termina-
tion he had made a verbal arrangement to sell Defenu-
ant's property for $60,500.00 or $4,500.00 more than h1 
had agreed to pay Defendant for it. He later obtainedaTI 
Earnest Money Agreement and $7 ,500.00 earnest mone! 
which he had to return when it became clear that Defen· 
ant would not perform her agreement. His testimony!1 
reinforced by an appraisal report (Exhibit D-12), wh!eil 
indicates Defendant's property had a value of $60,000.00 
Plaintiff's testimony is at R. 115 line 1toR.117 linei. 
There is no contradictory testimony. 
Plaintiff further testified that he lost the Clad 
Street Property through a mortgage foreclosure and tbal 
14 
hi8 financial difficulties began with the failure of this 
i!Pal (R. 124: line 22-24). rrhe value of Plaintiff's equity 
in the Clark Street Property was $10,000.00 according 
to the Agreement of the parties (Exhibit P-1). That 
value is reinforced by an appraisal report indicating a 
value of $35,000.00 (Exhibit P-3) and Plaintiff's testi-
mony that the amount for which it was foreclosed was 
slightly less than $25,000.00 (R. 122 line 11-18). Again 
there was no contradictory testimony. 
Plaintiff contends that if the court finds that De-
fendant's abrupt termination was not justified, Plain-
tiff's damages in the amount of $14,500.00 were proved 
without contradiction. The only items remaining that 
would have to be decided by a trier of fact are the matter 
of punitive damages, consequential damages arising 
from Plaintiff's inability to pay his bills and from his 
loss of credit reputation and attorney's fees. To avoid 
the neeessity of a new trial on those matters Plaintiff 
herewith offers to accept a Judgment in the sum of 
$14,500.00 plus costs in full satisfaction of his claims 
herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant was not entitled to terminate her contract 
with Plaintiff by any construction of the evidence. Plain-
tiff's damages incurred as a result of her wrongful 
al termination were uncontradicted and clearly proven. The 
15 
judgment of the trial court should be reversed and Plain 
tiff should be granted judgment in the sum of $1±,500.on 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gerald E. Nielson 
840 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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